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Judicial review of EU acts after the Treaty of Lisbon  
 
 
 
Steve Peers and Marios Costa* 
 
Introduction  
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides for two different 
methods of judicial control designed to ensure the legal exercise of power by EU institutions, 
offices, bodies and agencies.  The relevant provisions are now Articles 263, concerning direct 
actions for annulment, and 267, concerning indirect review via the preliminary reference 
procedure from the national courts. 
The Court of Justice had strictly interpreted the locus standi requirements set out in 
the former Treaties for private plaintiffs to challenge the legality of EU measures directly 
before the EU courts, despite widespread criticism in the legal literature over the last fifty 
years.1  As is well known, under Article 230(4) EC private parties were entitled to bring 
annulment proceedings before the General Court as long as they were ‘directly and 
individually concerned’ by the allegedly unlawful EU measure. Article 230(4) EC read as 
follows: 
 
Any natural or legal person may … institute proceedings against a decision 
addressed to that person or against a decision which, although in the form of a 
regulation or a decision addressed to another person, is of direct and individual 
concern to the former. 
 
Despite the criticism, the Court of Justice refused to amend its established case law and 
instead placed the burden on the member states for a Treaty amendment, ruling that ‘[…] it is 
for the Member States, if necessary … to reform the system currently in force’.2  To that end, 
the Treaty of Lisbon amended Article 230(4) EC (now Article 263(4) TFEU) as follows: 
 
Any natural or legal person may, under the conditions laid down in the first and 
second paragraphs, institute proceedings against an act addressed to that person, 
or which is of direct and individual concern to them, and against a regulatory act 
which is of direct concern to them and does not entail any implementing 
measures. 
 
                                                 
*
 Professor of Law, University of Essex and Lecturer in Law, City University. 
1
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The first limb of Article 263(4) TFEU is the same as the first limb of the prior Article 
230(4) EC, and so calls for no comment.  As for the second limb of Article 263(4) TFEU, it 
differs from the second limb of the prior Article 230(4) EC, as it has replaced the word 
‘decision’ by ‘act’ and deleted the words ‘although in the form of a regulation or a decision 
addressed to another person’.  However, these changes simply take account of the case law of 
the Court of Justice,3 which had departed from the literal wording of the Treaty provision on 
this point and interpreted it broadly already before the Treaty of Lisbon came into force, 
clearly permitting  private plaintiffs since the Codorniu judgment to challenge legislative 
regulations as long as they are directly and individually concerned by such measures.   
So the most significant change brought about by the Treaty of Lisbon is the new third 
limb of Article 263(4), which provides for the possibility for natural or legal persons to obtain 
standing to bring a direct action without having to meet the requirement of ‘individual 
concern’, provided that: (a) they still meet the requirement of ‘direct concern’ and their 
challenge is (b) brought against a ‘regulatory act’ which (c) ‘does not entail any 
implementing measures’.  This Treaty amendment has the potential to mitigate the gaps in 
relation to the locus standi of private plaintiffs, subject to acceptable interpretation by the 
judiciary.   
Therefore, the main focus of this analysis is upon the recent order (Inuit Tapiriit 
Kanatami)4 and the judgment (Microban)5 of the General Court, which ruled for the first time 
on the interpretation of Article 263(4) TFEU.  According to the Court, the new provisions do 
not make it easier for private parties to challenge EU legislative measures as defined by 
Article 289(3) TFEU, since such acts cannot be considered to be regulatory acts; the 
requirement of individual concern, as traditionally interpreted, continues to apply in full in 
such cases.  On the other hand, the Microban judgment confirms that the revisions to the 
locus standi rules do make it easier for private parties to challenge non-legislative acts 
directly in some cases.  
 
 
Background 
Before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, strict locus standi requirements for private 
litigants constitute oned of the very few areas of EU law where the legal literature was  
united, agreeing almost unanimously that fundamental gaps in judicial protection existed.6  
According to the cumulative criteria, the measure had to be of direct and individual concern 
to the legal position of the applicant.  Private parties were directly concerned when EU 
measures directly affected their legal position and left no discretion to the addressee, as they 
were ‘sufficient in themselves and require no implementing provisions’.7   
While it was possible for private litigants to challenge regulations directly given that 
by definition regulations preclude national implementing measures, it was problematic for 
private litigants to challenge directly the legality of directives since by definition, directives 
leave discretion to the member states.  The applicants in the Salamander8 case argued that not 
                                                 
3
 See Joined Cases 239 and 275/82 Allied Corporation and others v Commission [1984] ECR 1005; Case C-
358/89  Extramet v Council [1991] ECR I-2501; and Case C-308/89 Codorniu v Council  [1994] ECR I-1853. 
4
 Case T-18/10 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Commission, order of September 6, 2011, not yet reported.  
This order has been appealed to the Court of Justice (Case C-583/11 P, pending).   
5
 Case T-262/10 Microban v Commission , judgment of 25 October 2011, not yet reported.  This judgment has 
not been appealed to the Court of Justice.   
6
 A. Arnull, ‘Editorial: April Shower for Jégo-Quéré’, 29 European Law Review (2004) p. 287; C. Koch, ‘Locus 
standi of private applicants under the EU Constitution: preserving gaps in the protection of individuals’ right to 
an effective remedy’, 30 European Law Review (2005) p. 511. 
7
 Case 294/83 Parti Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v EP [1986] ECR 1339. 
8
 Joined Cases T-172/98 and T-175-177/98 Salamander and others v EP and Council  [2000] ECR II-2487.  
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all directives leave discretion to the member states as to their substantive implementation and 
that the directive in question was substantially clear, precise and unconditional and was 
producing legal effects on the applicants even though the time for transposition had not yet 
expired.  The Court indeed ruled that directives can be challenged directly.  The difficulty, 
however, is to meet the requirement of direct concern, since ‘a directive cannot of itself 
impose obligations on an individual and may therefore not be relied on as such against him’.9  
Directives can only be challenged directly by private parties where the effects of the directive 
are automatic or where the member states are expressly authorised to act in a particular 
manner.10  The EU courts therefore tended to direct private plaintiffs to their national courts 
to raise indirectly the legality of directives when they review transposition into the member 
state’s national legal system.11  The most recent approach is however exactly the same as the 
approach in Codorniu:12 directives fell within the scope of Article 230(4) EC, even though 
they were not mentioned in that provision, provided that the applicant could show direct and 
individual concern. 
Additionally, the concept of ‘individual concern’ has been extremely narrowly 
defined since the Plaumann case.13  In particular, individuals must be affected, ‘by reason of 
certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which they are 
differentiated from all other persons and by virtue of these factors distinguishes them 
individually just as in the case of the person addressed’.14  Due to this strict interpretation, the 
requirement of ‘individual concern’ in relation to directives and regulations has only been 
met in a very limited number of cases.15  However, in some areas such as competition law, 
anti-dumping and state aids the Court has treated standing requirements more generously and 
ruled that the Treaty standing requirements were satisfied.16 
The test of individual concern was criticised for being very restrictive, since it makes 
it impossible for an applicant to establish individual concern except in exceptional 
circumstances related to past events.17  The prospect of reform of the rules was raised when 
Advocate-General Jacobs in his opinion delivered in the UPA case challenged the established 
interpretation of the ‘individual concern’ requirement, and suggested that the requirement 
should be considered satisfied when ‘the measure has, or is liable to have, a substantial 
adverse effect on [the applicant’s] interest’.18  Shortly after the delivery of that opinion, the 
Court of First Instance (now the General Court) delivered a judgment highly influenced by it.  
The Court in Jégo-Quéré ruled that individual concern is met ‘[i]f the measure in question 
affects [an individual’s] legal position, in a manner which is both definite and immediate, by 
restricting his rights or by imposing obligations on him’.19  Nevertheless, the Court of Justice 
refused to relax the strict standing criteria and in UPA reaffirmed its unsatisfactory restrictive 
case law, leaving the burden on the member states ‘to establish a system of legal remedies 
and procedures’, and required national courts ‘to interpret and apply national procedural rules 
governing the exercise of action in a way that enables natural and legal persons to challenge 
                                                 
9
 Salamander (ibid.), at para. 54. 
10
 Salamander (ibid.). 
11
 Case T-99/94 Asocarne v Council [1994] ECR II-871. 
12
 Supra n. 3. 
13
 Case 25/62 Plaumann & Co v Commission  [1963] ECR 95. 
14
 Plaumann (ibid), at para. 31. 
15
 Case T-135/96 UEAPME v Council [1998] ECR II-2335; Joined Cases 87/77, 130/77, 22/83 and 9-10/84 
Salerno v Commission and Council [1985] ECR 2523. 
16
 Cases: C-152/88 Sofrimport Sarl v Commission [1990] ECR I-2477; 11/82 Piraiki - Patraiki v Commission 
[1985] ECR-207; and 239 and 275/82 Allied Corporation and others v Commission [1984] ECR 1005. 
17
 A. Ward, Judicial Review and the Rights of Private Parties in EU Law, 2nd edn (OUP, 2007). 
18
 Advocate General’s Opinion in UPA (supra  n. 2). 
19
 Case T-177/01 Jégo-Quéré et Cie SA  [2002] ECR II-2365 at para. 51. 
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the legality of any decision.’ 20   The same approach was confirmed in the Jégo-Quéré 
appeal.21 
 
Facts of the cases and Court rulings  
Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and others and Microban are the first cases in which the General 
Court has interpreted the substance of the revised locus standi rules.  The issue had not arisen 
in the case law previously, because the General Court had/s ruled that the revised Treaty 
provisions could not apply to proceedings which have been brought before the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon, since the admissibility of an application for annulment had to 
be resolved by the rules in force at the day on which the application for annulment was 
submitted.22  This approach, however, is not consistent with the case law of the Court of 
Justice regarding the extension of the Court’s jurisdiction over immigration, asylum and civil 
law cases pursuant to the Treaty of Lisbon, which repealed the prior restriction on the Court’s 
jurisdiction pursuant to Article 234 EC to references from final courts only.23  That case law 
establishes that the Court’s wider jurisdiction must be extended to cases which were referred 
to it from national courts before the Treaty of Lisbon came into force.24    
In Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and others case,25 a group of entities consisting of Inuit 
seal hunters and trappers and other organisations representing the interests of Inuit, as well as 
individuals and companies involved in the processing of seal products, sought the annulment 
of Regulation 1007/2009, adopted pursuant to the former co-decision procedure (now called 
the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’), on the prohibition of marketing of seal products.26  The 
applicants have also separately sought the annulment of a Commission Regulation 
implementing Regulation 1007/2009,27  arguing also in that case against the validity of the 
parent measure on the basis of the exception of illegality pursuant to Article 277 TFEU. 
The General Court dismissed the action as inadmissible.  The Court started by noting 
that the new locus standi requirement for private parties set out in Article 263(4) TFEU do 
not define the concept of ‘regulatory act’.  It was therefore necessary for the Court to carry 
out a ‘literal, historical and teleological interpretation of that provision.’   
First of all, it stated that the ‘ordinary meaning’ of the word ‘regulatory’ meant that 
‘regulatory acts’ were acts ‘of general application’.  Next, in the Court’s view, ‘it is clear 
that’ the new locus standi rule ‘does not relate to all acts of general application, but to a more 
restricted category, namely regulatory acts.’  In light of Article 263(1) TFEU, Article 263(4) 
created three types of locus standi: challenges against acts addressed to the person concerned; 
challenges against legislative or/and regulatory acts of general application (subject to the 
‘direct and individual concern’ threshold); and challenges against a category of acts of 
                                                 
20
 UPA (supra  n. 2) at paras. 41, 42 and 45. 
21
 Case C-263/02 P Jégo-Quéré v Commission [2004] ECR I-3425 at paras. 33 and 34. 
22
 Cases T-539/08 Etimine SA and Ab Etiproducts Oy v European Commission), at para. 76 and T-532/08 
Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta and Umicore v Commission, at para. 70 (orders of September 7, 2010, not yet 
reported). 
23
 Previous Art. 68(1) EC. 
24
 Case C-283/09 Weryński, judgment of February 17, 2011 (not yet reported) at para. 28, followed in Case C-
396/09 Interedil,  judgment of October 20, 2011 (not yet reported) at para. 20. 
25
  Supra  n. 4. The General Court also ruled three times on applications for interim measures in Case T-18/10 
(orders of: 30 April 2010, T-18/10 R [2010] ECR II-75*; 19 October 2010. T-18/10 R-II INTP (unreported); and 
25 October 2010, T-18/10 R-II, not yet reported).  The third interim measures order was appealed to the Court 
of Justice, which ruled that there was no need to adjudicate in light of the outcome of the main proceedings 
(Case C-605/10 P (R), order of 27 October 2011, not yet reported).   
26
  Reg. 1007/2009 on trade in seal products (OJ [2009] L 286/36).  Note that although the contested Regulation 
was adopted before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the revised locus standi rules applied, because 
the proceedings were brought after that Treaty’s entry into force: paras. 32 to 35 of the order.  
27
 Case T-526/10, pending, concerning Commission Regulation 737/2010 (OJ [2010] L 216/1).  
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general application, i.e. regulatory acts only (subject to the ‘direct concern’ threshold and the 
requirement that no implementing measures were entailed). This interpretation was supported 
by analogy with the reference to the member states’ ‘law, regulation or administrative action’ 
in Article 114 TFEU.  Furthermore, the Court rejected the idea that the new locus standi rule 
was meant to apply to delegated acts (adopted pursuant to Article 290 TFEU) only.   
Secondly, applying a historical interpretation, the documentation of the drafting of the 
Constitutional Treaty, which subsequently became the basis for the text of the Lisbon Treaty, 
supported the interpretation that the new locus standi rule applied to non-legislative acts only.  
Thirdly, a teleological interpretation supported the idea that the purpose of the new rule was 
to avoid the situation in which persons ‘have to infringe the law to have access to the court’, 
as regards non-legislative acts.   
The Court furthermore rejected the argument that the new locus standi provisions 
should receive a wide interpretation in light of Article 47 of the EU Charter of Rights (which 
provides for the right to an ‘effective remedy’), because the EU courts cannot alter the 
jurisdiction set out in the Treaties even in light of the principle of effective judicial protection 
(relying on pre-Lisbon case law).  It also rejected the argument that two specific international 
treaties might be relevant, since the applicants had not fully explained this argument and 
international treaties cannot override the provisions of EU primary law.   The General Court 
thus concluded that ‘the meaning of ‘regulatory act’ for the purposes of the fourth paragraph 
of Article 263 TFEU must be understood as covering ‘all acts of general application apart 
from legislative acts’.  
Furthermore, the Court ruled that the contested regulation was not a legislative act 
since ‘its categorisation as a legislative act or a regulatory act according to the [TFEU] is 
based on the criterion of the procedure, legislative or not, which led to its adoption’.28  In this 
case, the co-decision procedure had been used to adopt the act, so it was a legislative act.      
Since the contested regulation was not a regulatory but a legislative act, the pre-
Lisbon requirements for direct and individual concern,which were clearly unchanged, had to 
be established and the Court therefore examined whether these criteria were satisfied.  As 
regards direct concern, only those applicants which marketed seal products on the EU market 
met the test, 29  since others (such as those trapping seals in Canada) were less directly 
impacted by the EU rules and those rules furthermore to some extent required the adoption 
implementing measures to apply.  While five of the applicants did meet the test for direct 
concern, they all failed the test for individual concern, since the law in question ‘applies to 
objectively determined situations and produces legal effects in regard to categories of persons 
envisaged generally and in the abstract’, affecting all traders equally.   
 
 
In Microban, the dispute concerned the decision of the Commission implementing EU 
legislation which concerns plastic materials intended to come into contact with foodstuffs,30 
which withdrew from the list of permitted additives a material known as triclosan, with the 
effect of banning the marketing of triclosan in the Union.  The applicants were engaged in the 
production and marketing of triclosan, and so sought the annulment of the contested decision.   
  The Court ruled, first of all, that the decision of the Commission to withdraw triclosan 
from the list was a ‘regulatory act’ for the purposes of Article 263(4) TFEU,31 because it was 
a non-legislative act of general application, as it was adopted pursuant to a comitology 
                                                 
28
 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (supra  n. 4) at para. 65. 
29
 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (ibid) at para 75. 
30
 The decision was taken pursuant to Art. 11(3) of Reg. 1935/2004 (OJ [2004] L 338/4), and amended 
Commission Directive 2002/72 (OJ [2002] L 220/18) to remove triclosan from the list of permitted substances.  
31
 Microban (supra  n. 5) at paras. 20 to 25. 
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procedure and ‘applies to objectively determined situations and…produces legal effects with 
respect to categories of persons envisaged in general and in the abstract’.   
Secondly, the measure was of ‘direct concern’ to the applicants,32 because it met the 
twofold test, established as regards the requirement of ‘direct concern’ in the prior Article 
230 EC, of directly affecting the legal situation of the applicants and also leaving no 
discretion to its addressees (in this case, member states), who have the task of implementing 
it, ‘such implementation being purely automatic and resulting from Community rules without 
the application of other intermediate rules’.  The test was met because (a) the applicants 
purchased triclosan and then used it to manufacture products and (b) the decision left no 
option to member states but to ban the marketing of products including triclosan as from 1 
November 2011.  The Court justified the use of this prior definition on the grounds that the 
revision of Article 263(4) ‘pursues an objective of opening up the conditions for bringing 
direct actions’, so the concept of ‘direct concern’ in the context of bringing proceedings 
against regulatory acts ‘cannot, in any event, be subject to a more restrictive interpretation’ 
than the definition of the same concept in the pre-Lisbon case law.33   
Thirdly, as to whether the decision in question entailed ‘implementing measures’, the 
General Court ruled that it did not.34  The ban on marketing the substance was complete, and 
the member states had presumably already transposed the directives which the contested 
decision implemented.  While there was an option to permit the marketing of the substance 
during a transitional period, this was optional and did not ‘require’ implementing measures as 
such.  Any implementing measures which might be adopted during the transitional period 
would be ancillary to the pending prohibition of the substance, for which no implementing 
measures would be ‘necessary’.   
The Court then went on to rule, on the substance of the case, that the Commission’s 
act was illegal, inter alia because the parent act did not confer any power upon the 
Commission to ban any substance at all.35  In practice, then, the application of the new locus 
standi rules enabled the applicant to have annulled an illegal measure just one week before 
that measure would have banned the marketing of any product including triclosan.  
 
Comments and analysis 
The interpretation of the new third limb of Article 263(4) TFEU depends on the interpretation 
of the three separate elements of that provision.  The first key element is the meaning of the 
term ‘regulatory act’.  It is regrettable that such an important term was not defined clearly in 
the Treaty in the first place,36 but this is not the fault of the General Court.  As for the Court’s 
interpretation, it is clear that the Court has simply followed the distinction made by the Treaty 
of Lisbon (which it applied retroactively) between legislative and non-legislative acts.  
According to the Treaty, following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, Article 289 
TFEU specifies that there are two types of legislative procedure: the ordinary legislative 
procedure and special legislative procedures.  Any EU measure adopted by means of a 
legislative procedure is a legislative act (Article 289(3) TFEU).  The obvious implication is 
that any EU measure not adopted by a legislative procedure is not a legislative act.  
Additionally, there are several different types of non-legislative acts, most notably (but not 
only) delegated acts and implementing acts as defined in Articles 290 and 291 TFEU.  There 
                                                 
32
 Microban (ibid) at paras. 26 to 32. 
33
 Microban (ibid) at para. 32. 
34
 Microban (ibid) at paras. 33 to 38. 
35
 Microban (ibid) at paras. 40 to 69.  The General Court accepted two of Microban’s four pleas, and decided it 
was unnecessary to rule on the other two.   
36
 S. Balthasar, ‘Locus standi rules for challenges to regulatory acts by private applicants: the new Article 263(4) 
TFEU’, 35 European Law Review (2010) p. 542. 
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are also non-legislative acts based directly on the Treaties. 37   Since the General Court 
expressly rejected the idea that a legislative act might ever constitute a ‘disguised’ non-
legislative act, it therefore applied a purely formal concept of legislation, rather than a 
substantive concept.  So it seems clear that while the definition of ‘regulatory acts’ includes 
‘all acts of general application apart from legislative acts’, it cannot ever include a ‘legisltive 
act’, ie an act adopted pursuant to a legislative procedure.  
Applying this rule, the Microban judgment states unambiguously that comitology 
measures in principle fall within the definition of ‘regulatory acts’,38 as long as they are 
measures of general application, as defined by the Court.  This interpretation must apply a 
fortiori to delegated acts adopted pursuant to Article 290 TFEU, since the Treaty expressly 
specifies that these are ‘non-legislative acts of general application’, and moreover clearly 
distinguishes them from legislative acts.  Furthermore, by analogy with the Microban 
judgment, it should follow that implementing measures adopted by the Council,39 including 
pursuant to the ‘regulatory procedure with scrutiny’ (RPS),40 until it is fully replaced by the 
delegated acts procedure,41 must be considered ‘regulatory acts’ also.  So must measures 
adopted pursuant to other forms of ad hoc procedures by the Commission.  As for acts 
adopted on the basis of the Treaties, it should be concluded that any form of non-legislative 
act of general application should also be considered a regulatory act, in light of the definition 
of ‘regulatory act’ in the Inuit judgment and the absence of any suggestion in the Treaty or 
the Microban judgment that some other category of legal act exists.42  Of course, in order for 
the third limb of Article 263(4) TFEU to apply, it will still be necessary in every case to show 
also that the measure in question is of direct concern to the applicant and does not entail 
implementing measures.   
As for the General Court’s methods of interpreting the concept of ‘regulatory act’, its 
starting point that regulatory acts are acts of general application is unobjectionable, as it can 
be justified by comparing the wording of the first and third limbs of Article 263(4) TFEU.  
However, it does not necessarily follow from the wording of Article 263(4) that a ‘regulatory 
act’ is only a category of acts of general application. With great respect to the Court’s view, 
the wording of Article 263(1) does not in any way suggest such an interpretation either.   
In any event, even if the drafters of the Treaty of Lisbon intended to make a 
distinction between different categories of acts of general application as regards the third 
limb of Article 263(4), it does not follow that they specifically intended a distinction between 
legislative acts and non-legislative acts. In fact, the Court does not reach such a conclusion on 
the basis of a literal interpretation. The most obvious conclusion a purely literal interpretation 
of Article 263(4) suggests is instead that the Treaty drafters did not intend to distinguish 
between legislative and non-legislative acts.  If they had intended such a distinction, why not 
                                                 
37
 For instance, Art. 81(3) TFEU provides for the possible adoption of a decision changing the decision-making 
procedure as regards family law measures.  
38
 The act challenged in the Microban case was adopted prior to the reform of the comitology procedure effected 
by Reg. 182/2011 (OJ [2011] L 55/13), but there is no reason why the Court would have ruled differently if the 
act had been adopted pursuant to the revised comitology rules.  
39
 See Art. 291(2) TFEU. 
40
 For instance, see the Decision supplementing the Schengen Borders Code (OJ [2010] L 111/20), which is 
however subject to legal challenge by a privileged applicant (Case C-355/10 EP v Council, pending).   
41
 On the current legal framework for such measures, see S. Peers and M. Costa, ‘The Accountability of 
Delegated and Implementing Acts after the Treaty of Lisbon’, European Law Journal (forthcoming).  Of course, 
once the RPS procedure is fully replaced by the delegated acts procedure, any delegated acts then adopted by the 
Commission will be ‘regulatory acts’ for the purpose of Art. 263(4) also.  
42
 For a different view on this point, see C. Werkmeister, S. Pötters and J. Traut, ‘Regulatory Acts within Article 
263(4) TFEU—A Dissonant Extension of Locus Standi for Private Applicants’, 13 Cambridge Yearbook of 
European Legal Studies (2010-11) p. 311. 
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use more express and unambiguous wording? 43  After all, they chose to make a clear 
distinction between legislative acts and non-legislative acts in several other provisions of the 
Treaties. 44  Most significantly, since the Treaty drafters inserted an express reference to 
‘legislative acts’ in Article 263(1), but not in the third limb of Article 263(4), this obviously 
suggests that they intended a different scope of the relevant provisions.45   
Perhaps this is why the Court’s analysis moves hastily on to other methods of 
interpretation.  But it should be noted in passing that the Court’s limitation of the second limb 
of Article 263(4) TFEU to acts of general application is highly questionable.  Indeed, the 
General Court’s reasoning that the phrase ‘regulatory act’ in the third limb of Art. 263(4) 
necessarily refers only to acts of general application should obviously mean, a contrario, that 
the absence of this phrase in the second limb of Art. 263(4) means that this limb applies to 
acts of general or individual application46  Surely it is still possible that an act of individual 
application might be of ‘direct and individual concern’ to a person other than the addressee.47  
More generally, one might question whether a literal interpretation should play a significant 
role as regards the interpretation of Article 263, whereas it did not always play such a role in 
the past. 48   The pattern has been that private litigants can satisfy the standing requirements 
independently of the type of the contested measure.49  
As for the historical interpretation, the analysis of the General Court is clearly 
correct.50  However, again it might be questioned whether a historical interpretation is in 
principle suitable for the interpretation of the Treaties.51  Furthermore, the EU Courts have 
hardly been consistent in applying this principle.   
                                                 
43
 For instance, ‘…and against a non-legislative act [of general application]  which is of…’ 
44
 See, for instance: Arts. 15, 203, 290, 296, 297, 349 and 352 TFEU; Arts. 12(a), 16(8), 17(2), 24(1), 31(1) and 
48(7), revised TEU; Arts. 2-5 of the protocol on national parliaments; and Arts. 2-8 of the protocol on 
subsidiarity.  All of these references were inserted by the Lisbon Treaty drafters, whereas the distinctions 
between ‘law’ and ‘administrative action’ referred to by the General Court (in fact, the Court only explicitly 
refers to Art. 114 TFEU) were inserted as part of earlier Treaty amendments, and are therefore surely less 
relevant as regards the interpretation of the Treaty of Lisbon.  The comparison between Art. 290 TFEU (which 
the Treaty drafters expressly limited in scope to ‘legislative acts’ only) and Art. 291 TFEU (where the Treaty 
drafters decided to refer to all ‘legally binding Union acts’) is surely particularly relevant to the interpretation of 
Art. 263(4).  The General Court clearly followed the analysis by Koch (supra n. 6), p. 520, but her analysis did 
not consider this counter-argument either. 
45
 The General Court refers to the wording of Art. 263(1) to demonstrate the existence of a distinction between 
regulatory acts and other measures of general application, but fails to explain why the Treaty drafters used 
different words in the same paragraphs of the same Article when it discusses the definition of ‘regulatory acts’.  
46
 As long as the ‘direct and individual concern’ requirement is met, of course.   
47
 See, for instance, Case C-188/92 TWD [1994] ECR I-833.  Indeed, the General Court has confirmed this 
position as regards an action brought after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon: Case T-224/10, 
Association belge des consommateurs test-achats ASBL, judgment of 12 October 2011 (not yet reported), para. 
27.  
48
 See the case-law discussed at paras. 67-71 of the UPA opinion (supra  n. 2), and also the case law ignoring the 
express reference to decisions in the second limb of the prior Art. 230(4) EC (supra  n. 3). 
49
 Case T-45/02 Dow v EP and Council [2003] ECR II-1973. 
50
 In addition to the document referred to by the General Court, namely the Convention Presidium’s proposed 
Articles on the Court of Justice and the ‘High Court’ (Conv 734/03, 12 May 2003: see the commentary on the 
proposed amendments to Art. 230), see also, for instance: the final report of the discussion circle on the Court of 
Justice (Conv 636/03, 25 March 2003), at para. 22; the comments of the President of the Court of Justice (Conv 
572/03, 10 March 2003), at p. 4; and the comments of the President of the Court of First Instance (Conv 575/03, 
10 March 2003), at p. 4.  See also M. Varju, ‘The Debate on the Future of the Standing under Article 230(4) 
TEC in the European Convention’, 10 European Public Law (2004) p. 43 at pp. 54 and 56 and Koch (supra n. 
6), p. 520.  
51
 F. Jacobs, ‘The Lisbon Treaty and the Court of Justice’ in A. Biondi, P. Eeckhout and S. Ripley (eds), EU 
Law after Lisbon (OUP, 2012), p. 197 at p. 201. 
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As for teleological interpretation, the General Court’s reasoning on this point in effect 
repeats its historical analysis, since the Court’s sole argument for interpreting the third limb 
of Article 263(4) to mean that its purpose is to avoid applicants infringing the law in order to 
gain access to court is another reference to the same document forming part of the travaux of 
the negotiations on the Constitutional Treaty.  So in this case, teleological interpretation does 
not in fact form a separate strand of the General Court’s reasoning, and does not call for 
further comment.  
Finally, the General Court’s line of reasoning regarding the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights is, with great respect, not convincing.  Most significantly, the Court fails 
to take into account that since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the Charter has the 
‘same legal value’ as the Treaties.52  So reliance on the pre-Lisbon case law as regards the 
effect of the Charter on the system of judicial review of EU measures is now otiose. On the 
other hand, the Treaty requires that the Charter must be interpreted with ‘due regard’ to the 
explanations of the Charter referred to in it,53 and these explanations specify that Article 47 of 
the Charter ‘has not been intended to change the system of judicial review laid down by the 
Treaties, and particularly the rules relating to admissibility for direct actions before the Court 
of Justice of the European Union.’ Furthermore, according to these explanations, the 
‘Convention’ which drew up the Constitutional Treaty (which had included the Charter as 
part of its text) ‘has considered the Union's system of judicial review including the rules on 
admissibility, and confirmed them while amending them as to certain aspects, as 
reflected…in particular in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 [TFEU].’  The first part of this 
explanation does suggest that the Charter did not as such aim to amend the rules on judicial 
review, but then the explanations are not legally binding.   
There are five arguments in favour of the General Court’s interpretation of ‘regulatory 
act’ that it did not invoke.  First, its interpretation is the easiest to apply in practice, given that 
it is instantly obvious whether an EU measure was adopted by means of a legislative 
procedure or not.  However, that approach would wrongly give precedence to legal certainty 
and transparency over a more fundamental aspect of the rule of law – judicial accountability 
for the legality of acts of the public authorities, which can only be guaranteed by effective 
access to judicial review.54   
Secondly, the General Court’s interpretation of ‘regulatory act’ matches the hierarchy 
of norms of EU law as developed by the drafters of the Lisbon Treaty.55  This is an obvious 
teleological argument which the Court surprisingly overlooked. Similarly, it might also be 
noted that the Court’s approach to the definition of ‘regulatory act’ means that the system for 
the control of challenges to the legality of EU acts brought by non-privileged applicants will 
more closely match the system for the control of the legality of EU acts brought by privileged 
applicants as regards the allocation of cases between the General Court and the Court of 
Justice.56  However, this approach should be rejected because it means that the form which an 
                                                 
52
 Art. 6(1) TEU.  The Court of Justice has referred frequently to this development: see the case law beginning 
with Case C-555/07 Kücükdeveci [2010] ECR I-365.  
53
 See Art. 6(1) TEU, third sub-paragraph, and Art. 52(7) of the Charter.  The Court of Justice took these 
explanations into account, as regards a different aspect of Art. 47 of the Charter, in Case C-279/09 DEB, 
judgment of 22 December 2010, not yet reported.  
54
 F. Mancini and D. Keeling, ‘Democracy and the European Court of Justice’, 57 Modern Law Review (1994)  
p. 175 at p. 181. 
55
 Balthasar (supra n. 36). 
56
 See Art. 51 of the Statute of the Court of Justice.  It would even be possible to align the allocation of 
jurisdiction between the two EU Courts as regards the two categories of applicants precisely, by giving the 
General Court jurisdiction pursuant to Art. 256(3) TFEU over all references from national courts on the validity 
of non-legislative acts.  However, this would also mean giving the General Court jurisdiction over any questions 
of the interpretation of those acts which were referred along with the questions on validity; and there would 
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EU measure takes is less important than its substance, as regards the system for judicial 
control.57   
Thirdly, it can be argued that the General Court’s approach is comparable to 
distinctions made as regards judicial review of legislative and non-legislative acts found in 
the national law of many member states.58 But a comparison with the national law of the 
member states is not usually a factor in interpreting EU law.   
Fourthly, the fundamental argument underlying the second and third arguments is that 
judicial review of legislative acts should be limited as compared to non-legislative acts, given 
the greater democratic legitimacy of acts of elected parliaments as compared to acts of the 
executive.59 However, while this might be a valid argument within the context of the legal 
and political systems of member states, the more convincing counter-argument is that the EU 
legal and political system lacks the same legitimacy as those national systems, and so EU 
legislative acts should not benefit from the same degree of special protection.60  Furthermore, 
as Dougan has rightly observed, the definition of ‘legislative procedures’ in the Treaties is in 
many respects peculiar.61 It suffices to point out that the European Parliament (EP) has more 
control over delegated acts than it has over most acts adopted pursuant to a special legislative 
procedure,62 undercutting any argument based on democratic legitimacy.   
Finally, it has been argued that leaving national courts with the major role as regards 
judicial review of EU acts respects the principle of ‘judicial subsidiarity’.63 However, in this 
case, the application of the principle of subsidiarity points in the opposite direction: further 
centralization of the control of the validity of EU acts would clearly ‘be better achieved at 
Union level’,64  since it would establish a more effective system of judicial review than 
member states could achieve acting separately. In any event, since national courts already 
lack the key power to declare Union acts invalid,65 this train has already left the station.  
The second key element of the third limb of Article 263(4) is the meaning of ‘direct 
concern’.  On this point, it should be noted that in the Microban judgment, while the General 
Court made clear that the interpretation of this concept could not be less generous to plaintiffs 
as compared to the pre-Lisbon interpretation in the context of bringing proceedings against 
regulatory acts, the Court did not rule out the possibility that the interpretation of this concept 
might be more generous than the pre-Lisbon interpretation in the same context. The Court did 
not need to rule on this issue in the Microban case, because the applicant in any event met the 
pre-Lisbon threshold. So this point should be considered open. In any event, as noted already, 
                                                                                                                                                        
have to be a ‘tie-break’ rule if a national court referred questions on the validity of both types of measures.  See, 
for instance, Joined Cases C-92 and 93/09, Volker und Markus Schecke and Eifert, judgment of 9 November 
2010, not yet reported.  
57
 R. Barents, ‘The Court of Justice after the Treaty of Lisbon’, 47 Common Market Law Review (2010) p. 709 
at pp. 724-6 and J. Usher, ‘Direct and individual concern – an effective remedy or a conventional solution?’, 28 
European Law Review (2003) p. 575 at 599. 
58
 See J. Schwarze, ‘The Legal Protection of the Individual Against Regulations in European Union Law’, 10 
European Public Law (2004) p. 285 and Werkmeister et al (supra n. 42). 
59
 See Werkmeister et al, ibid.  
60
 See particularly M. Dougan, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning Minds, not Hearts’, 47 Common Market 
Law Review (2008) p. 617 at p. 678 and Usher (supra  n. 57).   
61
 Ibid. 
62
 Art. 290(2) TFEU provides that the EP can block the adoption of a delegated act by a component majority of 
its members, while most special legislative procedures provide for consultation of the EP only.  
63
 See Werkmeister et al (supra n. 42).  
64
 See Art. 5(3) TEU.  
65
 See Case 314/85 Foto-Frost [1987] ECR 4199 and further J. M. Cortes Martin, ‘Ubi ius, Ibi Remedium? – 
Locus Standi of Private Applicants under Article 230(4) EC at a European Constitutional Crossroads’, 11 
Maastricht Journal (2004) p. 233 at pp. 251-3.   
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the pre-Lisbon interpretation of ‘direct concern’ clearly continues to apply unchanged to the 
second limb of Article 263(4).66   
 Regarding the third key element of 263(4): the General Court’s interpretation ofthe 
phrase ‘does not entail implementing measures’ in the Microban judgment clearly assumes 
that an act can only ‘entail’ implementing measures for the purpose of Article 263(4) if it 
requires them to be adopted.  Moreover, the analysis of the third part of the new locus standi 
test in effect followed the same reasoning as the analysis of the second part (the ‘direct 
concern’ test), although the Court did not explicitly state that these two parts of the test were 
identical.   
This means that if future case law does relax the interpretation of ‘direct concern’ in 
the context of the third limb of Article 263(4), this would be of no avail if such relaxation 
concerns the part of the ‘direct concern’ test concerning the extent of discretion left to 
member states or EU bodies – since any applications for annulment would still be 
inadmissible on the grounds that any measures leaving a sufficient degree of discretion to 
member states or EU bodies would still ‘entail implementing measures’.  However, if future 
jurisprudence relaxed the interpretation of the ‘direct concern’ requirement as regards the 
extent of the measure’s impact on the applicants for annulment, this would be a genuine 
change.   
The alternative, more stringent, approach to the interpretation of the ‘implementing 
measures’ criterion would have been to insist that this criterion required plaintiffs to cross an 
additional hurdle besides the ‘direct concern’ requirement.67  For instance, this could mean 
that the new third limb of Article 263(4) could not apply even if the measure concerned 
required automatic implementing measures. It might be argued that this interpretation is 
suggested by the structure of the Treaty Article: why refer to both ‘direct concern’ and the 
absence of implementing measures unless these two criteria had independent meanings?  
However, the drafters of the Treaty of Lisbon were apparently content to repeat themselves in 
other parts of the Treaties,68 and such an interpretation would also disrespect the drafters’ 
intentions by eviscerating even the modest extension of locus standi for direct actions set out 
in that Treaty. The requirement that an act not ‘entail implementing measures’ may have been 
inserted simply to clarify the meaning of ‘direct concern’. 69   Moreover, for the sake of 
consistency it would have to follow that the Court should place greater weight upon the 
Treaty drafters’ choice to refer to ‘regulatory acts’ instead of ‘non-legislative acts’ in the new 
third limb of Article 263(4).70   
More generally, in its analysis of the third limb of Article 263(4) TFEU, the General 
Court did not consider the distinction between directives and regulations. In our view, 
directives fall outside the scope of the third limb of Article 263(4) for two reasons. Firstly, 
directives normally entail implementing measures since they require member states to 
achieve the directives’ objectives through their national laws.71 Secondly, the direct concern 
requirement would normally rule out the admissibility of annulment actions in relation to 
directives since it is unlikely that a private party could prove that a directive includes ‘a 
complete set of rules which are sufficient in themselves and which require no implementing 
                                                 
66
 See Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (supra  n. 4). 
67
 See Werkmeister et. al. (supra n. 42). 
68
 See most obviously the wording of Art. 4(1) TEU and the second sentence of Art. 5(2) TEU.   
69
 Similarly, the Court of Justice has ruled that Art. 1(1) of the special Protocol on the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights simply clarifies Art. 51 of the Charter itself: Case C-411/10 NS, judgment of 21 December 2011, not yet 
reported.  
70
 See Werkmeister et. al. (supra n. 42), who apply different canons of interpretation to these two aspects of Art. 
263(4).  
71
 Art. 288 TFEU; see S. Balthasar (supra n. 36).  
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provisions’, aside from the exceptions set out in the Salamander judgment.72 However, even 
though there will not normally be locus standi to challenge directives pursuant to the third 
limb of Article 263(4) TFEU, the Microban judgment makes clear that a regulation which is 
adopted to implement a directive is not ‘tainted’ for that reason alone, as far as the 
‘implementing measures’ criterion (and implicitly the ‘direct concern’ criterion) is concerned.  
The contribution of Microban as regards the locus standi of non-privileged parties is 
ultimately quite significant. As noted already, the General Court made it clear that the revised 
Article 263(4) TFEU ‘pursues an objective of opening up the conditions for bringing direct 
actions’,73 and the judgment confirms that Article 263(4) now grants more access to justice 
directly before the EU courts. This approach is fully compatible with the vast majority of 
legal literature in this area74 and also with the opinion of the former Advocate General Jacobs 
in UPA and the Court of First Instance judgment in Jégo-Quéré. Arguably, therefore, the 
General Court implicitly accepted that indirect challenges through Article 267 TFEU offer a 
lesser quality of justice.  
 
The post-Lisbon framework for judicial review  
The revised system for judicial review of EU acts can now be evaluated in light of both the 
initial judgments of the General Court clarifying the operation of that system, and the 
opportunity that the Court of Justice in the Inuit appeal will soon have of (re-)considering the 
essential aspects of that system. Essentially, there are two separate (but connected) key issues 
raised by the system: the fundamental question of access to a court and the consequential 
question of an effective remedy.75 Due to the primordial importance of these issues, the Court 
of Justice should take the opportunity to address the issue whether or not it agrees with the 
General Court that the concept of a ‘regulatory act’ cannot ever include legislative acts.  If it 
agrees with the General Court’s interpretation,76 the Court of Justice will need to justify its 
position in light of broad concerns about the legitimacy of the EU system for judicial review, 
including possible rebellions by national courts and the future supervision of the European 
Court of Human Rights, which may lead to conflicts between those courts and the Court of 
Justice.  If the Court of Justice disagrees with the interpretation of the General Court, it would 
still be necessary for the former Court to address the concerns about the EU system, given 
that on any likely interpretation of Article 263(4) TFEU there will always be some potential 
challenges to the validity of EU acts which fall outside its scope.It would surely not be a 
serious option for the Court to ‘pass the buck’ again to the member states, given the highly 
implausible prospect of further major Treaty amendment for the foreseeable future.    
In considering the overall framework for the judicial review of EU acts, the starting 
point is the case law of the Court of Justice, which has acknowledged that the principle of 
effective judicial protection ranks among the general principles of EU law, ‘stemming from 
the constitutional traditions common to the Member States’,77 and asserted that the Treaties 
                                                 
72
 Salamander (supra n. 9); UEAPME v Council (supra n. 15); Case T-223/01 Japan Tobacco Inc [2002] ECR 
II-3259; A. Albors-Llorens, ‘The Standing of Private Parties to Challenge Community Measures: Has the 
European Court missed the boat?’, 62 Cambridge Law Journal (2003) p. 72; Les Verts (supra  n. 7) at para. 31. 
73
 Microban (supra  n. 5) at para. 32. 
74
 Supra  n. 1. 
75
 See Koch (supra n. 6) at p. 515 and Enchelmaier (supra n. 1), p. 196. 
76
 Much of the literature interprets (in some cases reluctantly) a ‘regulatory act’ as a non-legislative act.  See: 
Koch (supra n. 6), p. 520; Varju (supra n. 50); Jacobs (supra n. 51); Barents (supra n. 57); Dougan (supra n. 
60), at p. 677; K. Lenaerts and T. Corthaut, ‘Judicial Review as a Contribution to the Development of European 
Constitutionalism’, 22 Yearbook of European Law (2004) p. 1 at p. 24; and P. Craig, The Lisbon Treaty: Law, 
Politics and Treaty Reform (OUP, 2010), at p. 131.  For the opposite view, see Balthasar (supra n. 36). 
77
 UPA (ibid), at para. 39. 
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have established ‘a complete system of legal remedies’ to ensure judicial review of EU acts.78  
The application of this system in practice should now be reassessed by the Court of Justice, in 
light not only of the revision of Article 263(4) TFEU, but also of the enhanced status of 
Article 47 of the Charter and the new Article 19(1) TEU, which provides inter alia  that 
‘Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the 
fields covered by Union law.’ Already, in Opinion 1/2009, the Court of Justice has 
interpreted this Article to mean that ‘the guardians of [the EU] legal order and the judicial 
system of the European Union are the Court of Justice and the courts and tribunals of the 
Member States’,79  and that this ‘judicial system’ includes the ‘complete system of legal 
remedies and procedures designed to ensure review of the legality of acts of the 
institutions’.80  It is notable that the Court of Justice has stressed the role of national courts 
pursuant to Article 19(1), even though they are not expressly mentioned in that Treaty 
provision.   
 
Access to a court 
The main problem in the UPA and Jégo-Quéré cases was that indirect review via the national 
courts was not possible because there was nothing in the national legal system to review since 
the impugned measure was a regulation which did not require any domestic implementing 
measure. This significant gap in judicial protection cannot be tolerated in a democratic 
society based on the rule of law.81 Although the Court of Justice has been willing to accept 
references from national courts concerning challenges to the validity of an EU measure even 
where national implementing measures have not been adopted,82 this is only possible where 
the relevant national law provides for such a remedy.83 
Assessing the key pre-Lisbon judgments in light of the revised system for judicial 
review,84 the impugned Regulation in Jégo-Quéré was adopted by the Commission, under the 
powers granted to it by Article 15 of Council Regulation 3760/92, which established a system 
for fisheries and aquaculture. This Regulation gave powers to the Commission to adopt 
emergency measures when the conservation of fish stock was threatened.85 Post Lisbon, the 
Commission has proposed new parent legislation which would continue to give it the power 
to adopt emergency measures by means of an ad hoc procedure. 86  In any event, the 
Commission’s acts do not require any implementing measures, so Jégo-Quéré would not have 
had to show individual concern to challenge this measure and it would therefore have been 
entitled to bring a direct action for annulment.87 
                                                 
78
 UPA (ibid); Jégo-Quéré (supra  n. 23). 
79
 Opinion of 8 March 2011, not yet reported, para. 66. 
80
 Ibid, paras. 70 and 71. 
81
 Jégo-Quéré (supra  n. 21). In reaching this conclusion the CFI expressly made a reference to the opinion of 
AG Jacobs in UPA (supra  n. 2), who suggested the relaxation of the test of individual concern as the only 
possible solution guaranteeing to private parties effective judicial protection. 
82
 See Case C-491/01 BAT [2002] ECR I-11453.  Furthermore, a similar measure to that in Jego-Quere was 
challenged easily enough via the national courts in Case C-221/09 AJD Tuna , judgment of 17 March 2011, not 
yet reported.  See generally J. Temple Lang, ‘Actions for declarations that Community regulations are invalid: 
the duties of national courts under Article 10 EC’, 28 European Law Review (2003) 102. 
83
 See Cortes Martin (supra n. 65), at 258-9.  
84
 See also: Koch (supra n. 6), pp. 525-6; Balthasar (supra n. 36), p. 544; Usher (supra  n. 57); Werkmeister et al 
(supra n. 42); and Cortes Martin (ibid), at pp. 250-1.  
85
 OJ [1992] L 389/1.  This parent legislation was replaced by Reg. 2371/2002 (OJ [2002] L 358/59), Art. 7 of 
which still provides for the Commission to adopt such emergency measures. 
86
 COM (2011) 245, 13 July 2011; see Art. 13 of the proposal.  
87
 On this point see Microban (supra  n. 5) at paras. 28-38.  Two pre-Lisbon direct challenges to similar 
measures are still pending (Cases T-329/08 AJD Tuna and T-330/08 Ligny Pesca di Guaiana Francesco), while 
another challenge was dismissed as inadmissible (Joined Cases T-313/08 to T-318/98 and T-320/08 to T-328/08, 
 14 
 
On the other hand, in cases where the contested act is a legislative act, the applicant 
still has to overcome strict requirements of direct and individual concern.88 In UPA, the 
impugned Regulation on the common organisation of the markets in oils and fats was adopted 
pursuant to a legislative process.89 So a challenge to such an act can still not be brought 
directly before the EU courts, in light of the General Court’s ruling in Inuit that a ‘regulatory 
act’ can only refer to an non-legislative act, ie an act not adopted by means of a legislative 
procedure. 
Although, as the Microban judgment makes clear, the Treaty of Lisbon has relaxed 
the locus standi for private litigants seeking to challenge regulatory acts directly, it has not 
changed the legal position as regards legislative acts. Moreover,even regulatory acts cannot 
be challenged directly if a private litigant cannot show direct concern or if the measure does 
entail any implementing measures. So while the revisions to Article 263 TFEU have rectified 
at least some of the cases where individuals may be left without a remedy, it is possible that 
some such gaps still exist, in particular because no implementing measures were taken, and 
there is no national act to challenge before domestic courts.   
In order to ensure that, as the Court of Justice claims, the EU legal order contains a 
complete system for the review of acts of the EU institutions, Article 19(1) TEU must 
therefore be interpreted to provide for a general right to challenge EU measures before 
national courts, even in the absence of direct concern or national implementing measures, 
subject to the general principles of equality and effectiveness, interpreted by analogy with the 
case law on national remedies for enforcement of EU law. The criteria for admissibility of 
direct actions set out in the new third limb of Article 263(4) TFEU, particularly the reference 
to ‘implementing measures’, should be understood in light of the objective of ensuring 
effective judicial protection, in which (a) access to some court must be guaranteed, and (b) 
the interpretation of Article 263(4) TFEU and Article 19(1) TEU in conjunction allocates 
jurisdiction to that end between national and EU courts. The extent of national courts’ 
obligations must go beyond the requirement to interpret national law ‘as far as possible’ in 
order to permit challenges to EU measures (as set out in the UPA judgment), to include an 
obligation to set aside any national rules which prevent or unduly hinder access to the 
national courts in this context.90  While it might be objected that such a rule would require too 
many changes in national legal systems, the Court has already required far-reaching changes 
in such systems in order to ensure the effectiveness of EU law.   
 
Access to an effective remedy 
This brings us to the question of whether the system for challenges to the validity of EU 
measures via actions brought before national courts pursuant to Article 267 TFEU can be 
considered effective. The Court of Justice’s traditional assumption that this form of challenge 
is sufficiently effective is problematic, in particular for the reasons pointed out by Advocate 
General Jacobs in his UPA opinion.91 First and foremost, national judges have no power to 
rule that EU measures are invalid,92 but only the power to issue provisional measures,93 if 
                                                                                                                                                        
Veromar di Tudisco Alfio & Salvatore and Others [2009] ECR II-228*).  A post-Lisbon direct challenge to a 
similar measure is now pending also: Case T-367/10 Bloufin Touna Ellas Naftiki Etaireia .  
88
 See supra n. 13. 
89
 Reg. 1638/98 (OJ [1998] L 210/32).  The relevant rules now form part of the single Common Market 
Organisation Regulation (Reg. 1234/2007, OJ [2007] L 299/1), which was also adopted pursuant to a legislative 
process.   
90
 See by analogy Kücükdeveci (supra n. 52), and furthermore Usher (supra  n. 57) at p. 598, who argues that the 
new provision is ‘more than a simple consolidation of prior case law’.   
91
 Opinion in UPA (supra n. 2). 
92
 Foto-Frost (supra n. 65).  The Court of Justice based its reasoning on the need to safeguard the uniformity of 
EU law. 
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they refer the question of the validity of the EU act to the Court of Justice – which they are 
obliged to do, if they have serious doubts about the validity of that measure. Private litigants 
at this stage can only argue for the invalidity of the measure, but the decision on whether or 
not to refer the case is taken by the national judge. Therefore, it is clear that private parties 
cannot initiate proceedings concerning the invalidity of EU law via Article 267 TFEU as a 
matter of legal right. Furthermore, as Advocate-General Jacobs pointed out, proceedings via 
Article 234, now Article 267, do not comply fully with the principle of effective judicial 
protection because interim measures are limited in application to the territory of the member 
state concerned.   
Interpreting Article 19(1) TEU in light of Article 47 of the Charter, the first objection 
to the effectiveness of Article 267 could be addressed by extending the CILFIT test fully to 
all challenges to the validity of EU measures brought via national courts.94  This would mean 
that any national court would have to refer any challenge to the validity of an EU act to the 
Court of Justice not just where it had serious doubts about the validity of that act, but in all 
cases where the validity of an EU act is challenged, unless there is no reasonable doubt that 
the argument is (partly or wholly) unfounded, the Court of Justice had already ruled on an 
identical challenge or (taking account of the particular context of questions on validity) the 
plaintiff failed to bring a direct action against that measure pursuant to Article 263(4) within 
the two-month time limit, if there was no doubt that the plaintiff would have standing to bring 
such a direct action.95 Such a change would entail Köbler liability if national courts failed to 
comply with their obligations;96 and arguably, given the obligation on all national courts to 
refer questions, in this context Köbler liability should apply no matter which level of court 
failed to refer.  
This reform of the system would simultaneously address the concerns about the 
delays and costs in the Article 267 procedure, since it should mean that most references on 
validity would come from national courts of first instance. In any event, the costs and delays 
stemming from the Article 267 procedure have to be compared to the lengthy delays inherent 
in proceedings before the EU General Court, the possible further delays of an appeal to the 
Court of Justice,97 and the extra costs entailed by lawyers’ travel to Luxembourg if a hearing 
is held.  
A number of objections to this suggestion might be anticipated.  First of all, it might 
be objected that it would amount to an amendment to the wording of the Treaty by judicial 
fiat. But the Court already ignored the wording of the Treaty when it banned national courts 
from ruling that EU acts were invalid98 – so it may as well be hung for a sheep as a lamb.   
Secondly, it might be argued that such a change would breach the principle of 
‘judicial subsidiarity’.  But, as already argued above, the principle of subsidiarity points 
towards greater centralization of the control of the validity of EU acts, since this can more 
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 Case 283/81 CILFIT [1983] ECR 3415. 
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 See TWD (supra n. 47). 
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court in order to challenge EU measures in the first place.  See Enchelmaier (supra n. 1), p. 199.  
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average of 24 months to give rulings in ‘other direct actions’, and the Court of Justice took an average of 14 
months to give rulings on appeals (Annual Report of the Court of Justice (2010), p. 183 and p. 96).  So the 
reference took 32 months to resolve, whereas a direct action and appeal would have taken 38 months on average 
(if appealed).   
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 Foto-Frost (supra n. 65).  Since Art. 267 TFEU only requires final courts to refer questions on the validity or 
interpretation of EU law to the Court of Justice, it should follow from a literal interpretation of Art. 267 that 
lower courts can rule on the validity or interpretation of EU acts without sending a reference.  
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easily be achieved at EU level than by the member states acting alone. This is true a fortiori 
as regards the effectiveness of remedies.    
Thirdly, a similar but subtler argument is that such a system would upset the nature of 
the relationship between the Court of Justice and national courts, transforming it (as far as 
questions of validity of EU law are concerned) into a hierarchical and appellate relationship.  
Yet the system would not really be transformed in this way, for national courts would not be 
giving a ruling on the validity of EU law which the Court of Justice would be quashing – 
although it would still be open to national courts, if they wished, to express their opinions on 
the well-foundedness of the arguments against the validity of the EU measures concerned.   
Fourthly, an entirely different line of argument is that such a system would leave so 
little for national courts to do as regards disputes concerning the validity of EU measures that 
they might as well be deprived of any role in such cases altogether. However, such an 
argument should be rejected, because sometimes the questions concerning the validity of EU 
acts will only arise in the context of national implementation and application of EU acts, and 
a continued role for the national courts reflects the decentralized application of EU law.99 It is 
often also useful to combine questions on the validity of EU law with questions on its 
interpretation, but Article 263 TFEU does not provide as such for questions on the 
interpretation of EU law to be raised. Indeed, in some member states, national courts are 
already familiar with the role of acting as a filter for challenges to the validity of national 
legislation, which they then refer to a national constitutional court.100   
Finally, it could be argued that a change in the rules of this sort, coupled with greater 
access to national courts to challenge EU measures in the first place, would lead to judicial 
overload for the Court of Justice. The answer to this objection is that ensuring the legitimacy 
of EU law cannot be subordinated to purely administrative or economic concerns, and that in 
any event the workload of national courts might be alleviated by such a reform, since more 
cases would be referred from courts of first instance. Also, a ruling on the validity of an EU 
act by the Court of Justice would usually forestall any need for the General Court to rule on 
the same act.101   
Addressing the remaining objections to the use of Article 267 raised by Advocate-
General Jacobs, the Court of Justice should accept that it has jurisdiction to provide for EU-
wide interim measures in cases where a national court has referred the validity of a contested 
EU measure to the Court of Justice, if there is a good reason, at least in cases where an 
applicant with activities in multiple member states would otherwise have to bring 
proceedings in all of those states in order to obtain interim protection or where the party 
challenging the validity of the EU measure has a cogent reason to ask the Court of Justice for 
interim measures even though the national court has refused such a request.  National courts 
would still retain the primary role in deciding on interim relief.  Such a change would hardly 
violate the wording of the Treaties; rather it would respect the plain language of the Treaty 
far more than the Court’s current jurisprudence on this issue.102  Finally, the current rules on 
exchanges of pleadings and interventions applying to challenges to the validity of EU 
measures pursuant to Article 267 can be improved simply by changing the Court of Justice’s 
Statute and/or rules of procedure.   
 
Conclusions  
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The Court of Justice now faces a choice whether to reaffirm the General Court’s order in 
Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami on appeal. For the reasons set out in this paper, it would be preferable 
to overturn this order and provide for direct actions against some EU legislative acts. But in 
any event, the Court of Justice should take this opportunity to recast the EU’s system for the 
judicial review of EU acts, to ensure both access to a court in order to challenge all EU acts 
and an effective system for challenging those acts when actions are brought via national 
courts. 
